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From	Quantum	to	Classical	Physics:	The	Role	of	Distinguishability		 R.	E.	Kastner∗	14	August	2017		Paper	presented	at	workshop:	Identity,	indistinguishability	and	non-locality		in	quantum	physics,	Buenos	Aires,	June	2017	(Organizer:	Olimpia	Lombardi)				ABSTRACT.	The	transition	from	quantum	to	classical	statistics	is	studied	in	light	of	Huggett’s	finding	that	the	empirical	data	do	not	support	the	usual	claim	that	the	distinction	between	classical	and	quantum	objects	consists	in	the	capacity	of	classical	objects	to	carry	permutable	labels	as	opposed	to	quantum	objects.	Since	permutation	of	the	labels	of	classical	objects	counts	as	a	distinct	configuration,	this	feature	is	usually	taken	as	signifying	that	classical	objects	are	not	identical	while	quantum	objects	are.	Huggett’s	finding	threatens	that	characterization	of	the	distinction	between	classical	and	quantum	objects.	The	various	statistical	distributions	are	examined,	and	it	is	found	that	other	distinctions,	corresponding	to	separability	and	distinguishability,	emerge	in	the	classical	limit.	The	role	of	the	chemical	potential	(the	rate	of	change	of	the	Helmholtz	free	energy	with	particle	number)	is	found	to	be	of	crucial	significance	in	characterizing	this	emergence	of	classicality	from	the	quantum	distributions.		 		 			 This	paper	consists	of	three	main	sections.	In	Section	1,	I	review	Nick	Huggett’s	finding	regarding	the	non-relevance	of	permutable	labeling	for	the	classical/quantum	divide	(Huggett	1999).	In	Section	2,	I	review	the	derivations	of	the	classical	and	quantum	statistics	and	argue	that	a	form	of	separability	is	a	key	feature	of	the	quantum-to-classical	transition.	In	Section	3,	I	consider	the	question:	What	allows	separability	to	serve	as	a	form	of	distinguishability	in	the	classical	limit?	First,	let	us	review	some	basic	considerations	regarding	issues	of	individuality	and	distinguishability.			 Steven	French	(2015)	has	noted	that	the	concept	of	individuality	is	primarily	a	metaphysical	isssue,	while	that	of		distinguishability	is	primarily	an	epistemological	issue.	Nevertheless,	distinguishability	does	have	bearing	on	ontological	questions	such	as:	What	is	an	individual?	Are	there	any	true	individuals?	Does	Leibniz’	Principle	of	Identity	of	Indiscernibles	apply	to	Nature?			However,	I	will	not	enter	here	into	the	metaphysical	debate	concerning	questions	such	as	“what	is	an	individual?”	and	“are	quantum	systems	individuals?”	Rather,	I	will	focus	on	the	issue	of	
distinguishability	regarding	the	quantum-classical	divide,	and	attempt	to	identify	some	ontological	features	that	may	underlie	the	form	of	distinguishability	obtaining	in	that	context.																																																									
∗	Foundations	of	Physics	Group,	UMCP;	rkastner@umd.edu	1	This	concept	can	be	identified	with	the	term	‘transcendent	individuality’	(TI)	as	discussed	in	French	and	Readhead	(1988).		
		
					1.	Huggett's	finding	on	Haecceitism	and	Classical	Objects			 Davis	Lewis		(1986)	introduced	the	term	haecceitism	,	which	denotes	a	form	of	strong	individuality:	an	individual’s	identity	is	taken	as	a	primitive	"this-ness"	which	transcends	all	its	qualitative	features.1	(Anti-haecceitism	consists	in	saying	that	an	individual’s	identity	is	constituted	by	its	qualitative	features	and	nothing	more.)	Although	the	precise	definition	of	haecceitism	is	still	a	matter	under	discussion,	for	our	purposes	we	can	think	of	it	as	the	capacity	of	an	entity	to	carry	a	label	or	'name,'	where	that	label	is	not	contingent	on	any	of	its	qualitative	features.	Thus,	what	makes	a	person	named	Fred	"Fred	the	individual"	is	his	primitive	this-ness,	not	the	color	of	his	eyes	or	hair	or	his	height,	weight,	etc.				 Now	let	us	consider	this	notion	as	applied	to	some	typically	classical	objects,	such	as	a	pair	of	coins	that	are	assumed	to	be	completely	identical	and	can	be	either	‘heads’	or	‘tails.’	Give	them	name-labels,	say		“Fred”	and	“Joe”--	their	assumed	haecceitism	is	represented	by	their	name-labels.	In	this	context,	haecceitism	implies	that	if	we	consider	the	case	in	which	Fred	and	Joe	are	in	different	states	(one	of	them	being	'heads'	and	the	other	'tails'),	then	interchanging	Fred	and	Joe	constitutes	two	different	possible	configurations.	Including	the	cases	in	which	Fred	and	Joe	are	both	'heads'	or	both	'tails,'	we	have	four	possible	states	of	the	coins:		
	 			In	contrast,	for	a	pair	of	hypothetical	‘boson	coins,'	the	usual	story	is	that	there	is	no	such	thing	as	‘Fred’	or	‘Joe’--	no	nameable	identity	that	transcends	the	qualitative	properties	of	the	quantum	coins.	So	the	possible	configurations	are	just	three	in	number:2																																																											1	This	concept	can	be	identified	with	the	term	‘transcendent	individuality’	(TI)	as	discussed	in	French	and	Readhead	(1988).		2	It	should	be	noted	that	French	and	Redhead	(1988)	dissent	from	this	usual	identification	of	individuality	with	the	capacity	to	carry	a	label	such	that	permutation	of	the	labels	establishes	a	different	state	of	the	total	system.	They	argue	that	a	form	of	individuality	can	still	be	retained	for	quantum	systems	if	one	argues	that	certain	states	are	not	accessible	to	the	total	system.	For	purposes	of	this	discussion,	we	work	with	Huggett’s	formulation,	but	note	that	his	interpretation	of	the	metaphysical	bearing	of	the	labels	is	not	obligatory.	
		
	 			 Huggett		(1999)	notes	that	there	are	two	ways	of	describing	the	state	space	of	a	composite	system	such	as	the	set	of	two	coins.	We	can	either	use	a	phase	space	(Γ-space)	description,	which	specifies	which	component	system	is	in	which	state,	or	we	can	use	a	distribution	space	(Z-space)	description,	which	just	specifies	how	many	systems	are	in	each	state.	The	Γ-space	description	assumes	that	each	component	can	be	meaningfully	labeled	and/or	distinguished	from	the	others,	so	it	supports	H-ism	in	that	respect.	In	contrast,	since	Z-space	specifies	only	the	occupancy	number	of	each	state,	without	identifying	any	particular	system	with	any	particular	state,	it	doesn’t	support	haecceitism	in	the	same	way.	Since	it's	typically	supposed	that	the	key	distinction	between	classical	and	quantum	objects	is	the	ability	of	the	former	to	carry	a	label,	one	would	think	that	the	two	kinds	of	descriptions	--phase	space	and	distribution	space	--would	lead	to	different	kinds	of	statistics;	i.e.,	classical	and	quantum	statistics,	respectively.		 However,	Huggett	shows	that	if	we	assume	that	classical	objects	are	impenetrable--i.e.	that	no	more	than	one	such	object	can	never	occupy	a	given	spacetime	point--then	it	turns	out	that	the	
Γ-	and	Z-space	descriptions	give	the	same	empirical	predictions.	Thus,	we	cannot	use	any	experimental	data	to	decide	between	them.	This	means	that	there	is	no	empirical	support	for	the	idea	that	classical	and	quantum	objects	differ	fundamentally	in	their	metaphysical	nature	as	individuals.		 The	basic	argument	goes	like	this:	in	terms	of	the	coin	analogy,	we	have	to	pretend	that	there	are	no	other	qualitative	differences	between	the	coins	and	forbid	the	two	coins	'Fred'	and	'Joe'	(they	can	keep	their	labels)	from	occupying	the	same	state.	Of	course,	real	coins	would	not	fulfill	this	criterion.	For	the	more	realistic	case	of	classical	gas	molecules,	the	operative	condition	is	that	no	two	molecules	can	ever	occupy	the	same	individual	phase	space	state,	since	they	can	never	be	at	the	same	spacetime	point.		 	In	the	case	of	the	idealized	coins,	if	we	forbid	them	from	occupying	the	same	state,	there	are	now	only	two	available	composite	Γ-states	for	Fred	and	Joe--the	ones	in	which	they	are	in	different	'heads'	or	'tails'	states:	 	
		
		And	since	both	of	these	correspond	to	the	distribution	"one	coin	in	each	state",	the	frequency	of	this	distribution	is	2/2	=1.	Meanwhile,	the	frequency	of	this	distribution	in	terms	of	the	Z-space	representation,	which	ignores	the	phase	space	configurations,	is	just	1/1	=1.	We	see	that,	for	the	idealized	classical	coins,	the	frequency	of	occurrence	of	the	distribution	is	exactly	the	same	in	either	representation,	so	there	is	no	empirical	difference	between	the	two	spaces—they	both	predict	the	same	probabilities.	Huggett	shows	that	this	holds	in	general,	for	an	arbitrary	number	of	systems	and	states	(i.e.,	in	which	the	frequency	of	a	given	distribution	may	differ	from	unity	in	contrast	to	the	trivial	example	above).			 Thus,	it	turns	out	that	there	is	no	empirical	support	for	the	Γ-space	description	over	the	Z-space	description	for	classical	systems,	if	they	are	correctly	characterized	as	impenetrable)--and	thus	(IF	one	identifies	that	as	a	criterion	for	haecceitism	as	does	Huggett),	no	empirical	support	for	haecceitism	as	applying	to	classical	objects.3	While	somewhat	bewildering	for	our	intuitions	about	the	difference	between	classical	and	quantum	objects,	we	actually	need	this	result.	Why?	Because,	in	keeping	with	the	correspondence	principle,	the	classical	(Maxwell-Boltzmann)	distribution	must	(and	does)	emerge	as	a	limit	from	quantum	statistics	(either	Bose-Einstein	or	Fermi-Dirac).		That	is,	the	quantum	distributions	transition	smoothly	into	the	classical	distribution.	This	calls	into	question	the	idea	that	classical	objects	have	any	sort	of	“digital”	or	on/off	distinguishability	or	individuality	feature(s)	that	differ	from	quantum	objects.			 Thus,	the	challenge	facing	us	is	that	the	transition	from	the	quantum	domain	to	the	classical	domain	seems	continuous,	not	discrete	and	essential	(as	in	a	change	of	intrinsic	character	or	essence).	This	is	another	puzzling	feature	of	the	micro/macro	divide.	In	the	next	section,	we	review	the	derivations	of	each	kind	of	distribution,	and	consider	what	clues	we	might	find	therein	to	better	understand	the	ontology	underlying	the	transition	between	the	quantum	and	classical	statistics.			2.	Classical	vs.	quantum	statistics				 Let	us	begin	by	simply	listing	the	three	major	distributions;	the	classical	Maxwell-Boltzmann,	Bose-Einstein	for	bosons,	and	Fermi-Dirac	for	fermions,	respectively:																																																										3	Based	on	the	dissent	of	French	and	Redhead	(1988)	from	the	above	criterion	for	transcendental	individuality,	these	authors	could	of	course	still	argue	that	both	quantum	systems	and	classical	possess	metaphysical	individuality.	What	is	off	the	table,	in	view	of	Huggett’s	argument,	is	the	idea	there	is	any	empirical	support	for	a	fundamental	difference	between	quantum	and	classical	systems	regarding	their	status	as	individuals.	
		
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (1a,b,c)		
		
			In	the	quantum	distributions	(1b)	and	(1c),	the	chemical	potential	µ		(related	to	the	number	of	degrees	of	freedom	N)	necessarily	enters	for	systems	with	a	fixed	N.	This	will	turn	out	to	be	significant,	as	we	shall	see.				 Now,	recall	that	classical	distributions	can	only	be	wavelike	or	particle-like.	The	particle-like	classical	distribution	(applying	to	systems	such	as	ideal	gases)	is	just	the	Maxwell-Boltzmann	distribution	(1a).	Meanwhile,	the	classical	wave	distribution	is	what	was	applied	to	blackbody	radiation	prior	to	the	advent	of	quantum	theory,	resulting	in	the	Rayleigh-Jeans	distribution	and	the		‘ultraviolet	catastrophe’	:		
	 	 	 	 (2)	In	view	of	'wave-particle	duality,'	it	is	well	known	that	the	quantum	distributions	interpolate	between	these	two	extremes,	as	follows.	Consider	the	correct	quantum	distribution	for	electromagnetic	blackbody	radiation	(the	“Planck	Distribution”):	
	
	 	 	 	 (3)		For	energies	e	small	compared	to	kT,	this	becomes		
	 	 	 (4)		i.e.,	it	yields	the	Rayleigh-Jeans	law	(2).		
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	 On	the	other	hand,	for	ε	large	compared	to	kT,	the	exponential	in	the	denominator	swamps	the	unity	term	and	we	get		
	 	 	 	 	 (5)			which	is	the	Maxwell-Boltzmann	distribution,	reflecting	particle-like	(or	at	least	discrete)	behavior	on	the	part	of	the	radiation.	(To	better	reveal	the	basic	form	of	the	distribution	in	this	limit,	we	neglect	the	factors	corresponding	to	the	density	of	states	for	blackbody	radiation.)				 Thus,	we	see	that	the	quantum	statistics	interpolate	between	wavelike	and	particle-like	behavior.	This	is	a	key	aspect	of	quantum	systems	as	opposed	to	classical	systems;	the	latter	can	be	unambiguously	categorized	as	either	waves	or	particles.	In	contrast,	the	quantum	statistics	must	cover	both	situations	in	the	same	distribution--indicating	that	they	describe	entities	that	are	(somehow)	both	wave	and	particle.				 If	we	look	at	the	assumptions	that	go	into	deriving	the	various	distributions,	we	can	get	some	additional	clues	as	to	the	key	differences	between	the	classical	and	quantum	situation.	For	example,	the	classical	Maxwell-Boltzmann	distribution	for	an	ideal	gas	(e.g.,	a	system	of	N	molecules)	is	obtained	from	a	partition	function	assumed	to	be	the	direct	product	of	the	N	individual	molecular	partition	functions.		This	cannot	be	done	for	the	quantum	statistics	for	fixed	
N.	We	will	now	consider	those	issues	in	detail.				 First,	let's	recall	the	general	procedure	for	obtaining	a	distribution	describing	the	mean	number	of	systems	nr 	in	a	given	energy	state	εr.	This	procedure	holds	regardless	of	the	type	of	system	considered	(whether	quantum	or	classical).		
 The	number	of	degrees	of	freedom	having	energy	εr		is	denoted	nr								
 Thus, the possible energy states ER of the whole gas (having N particles) are: 		 		 ER		=n1ε1	+	n2ε	2	+…=		Σr	nrε	r		;			 	 	 	 (6)			 	 and	N	=		Σr	nr			 	 	 	 	 	 (7)			At	this	point,	it	may	already	be	noted	that	(6)	represents	a	distribution	over	the	possible	energy	states,	and	in	that	sense	is	the	"Z-space"	representation.	Since	this	is	a	general	derivation	(leading	to	both	classical	and	quantum	statistics),	it	is	clear	that	the	Z-space	representation	is	applicable	for	both	cases,	reinforcing	Huggett's	observation.			 Now,	for	the	case	in	which	the	total	system	of	N	degrees	of	freedom	is	taken	as	capable	of	exchanging	energy	with	its	environment	at	temperature	T	(the	'canonical	ensemble'),	the	probability	that	the	total	system	is	in	the	state	R	is	given	by	
P(ε >> kT )∝ 1
e
ε
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	 	 	PR	=C	exp(−βER),	 	 	 	 	 	 (8)	
	
		where	β	=	1/kT.			 The	constant	of	proportionality	C	is	1/Z,	where	Z		is	the	total	system	partition	function:		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (9)		So	the	probability	that	the	gas	is	in	state	R	is:		
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (10)		From	this	we	can	find	the	average	number	of	degrees	of	freedom	in	energy	state	εr		:				
		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (11)		So	that	in	compact	form,			
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (12)		Again,	this	is	a	general	result	for	any	partition	function	Z.				 Now,	for	a	single	degree	of	freedom	with	possible	energy	states	εi,	the	partition	function	ζ		(i.e.,	the	weighted	sum	over	the	possible	energy	states)	is	given	by:		 	 	 	 	 ζ	= 𝑒!!!!! 	 	 	 	 			 	 (13)		So,	analogously	with	(10),		the	probability	that	a	single	system	is	in	state	εi		is				
	 	 		 	 														(14)		
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	We	make	note	of	this	because	for	a	classical	gas	of N	degrees	of	freedom,	one	finds	the	average	number	simply	by	taking	Z(N)	for	the	entire	gas	as	the	product	of	the	individual	partition	functions:		
	 	 	 	 	 	 (15)	 	 	So	that,	using	(12),		the	distribution	for	becomes:			
	 	 	 (16)		which	is	just	the	Maxwell-Boltzmann	distribution	(1a).		 		 However,	one	cannot	use	the	expression	(15)	for	quantum	systems	that	have	a	constrained	number	of	degrees	of	freedom	N--and	this	is	of	crucial	significance.	Instead,	one	must	incorporate	the	restriction	to	N	by	way	of	the	chemical	potential	µ,	which	acts	as	a	Lagrange	multiplier.	This	dictates	that	we	are	working	with	the	"grand	canonical	ensemble,"	which	allows	N 	to	vary.	The	corresponding	grand	canonical	partition	function	Ž	is	obtained	as	follows:		
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⎟⎟... 		(17)		This	is	just	a	product	of	infinite	sums	of	the	form	 xn
n=0
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∑ = 11− x , 		 x <1 ;		and	given	that		µ	<	εr	,	we	therefore	have			
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∑ 1− e−β (εr−µ )( ) 	 	 	 	 	 	 (19)	And	then	can	use	(12)	to	get	the	distribution	for	average	occupation	number	ns :		
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eβ (εs−µ ) −1 ,	 (20)		which	is	the	Bose-Einstein	distribution.				 The	first	thing	to	notice	here	(besides	the	fact	that	we	could	not	use	(15)	to	obtain	this	quantum	distribution)	is	that	the	total	number	of	degrees	of	freedom,	N,	seems	to	have	'disappeared.'	It	got	‘dissolved’	into	infinite	sums	over	all	the	possible	values	of	the	ns(εs).	Thus,	ironically,	N	has	to	become	a	variable	in	order	to	be	able	to	‘fix’	N	for	a	gas	of	quantum	systems.	We	recover	N	as	the	sum	over	the	average	occupation	numbers	ns	:			 	 	 N ≡ N = ns
s
∑ 		 	 	 	 	 	 (21)			The	situation	is	similar	for	fermions,	except	that	they	obey	the	Pauli	Exclusion	principle	which	limits	state	occupancy	to	zero	or	one.	Without	going	through	the	derivation	here,	we	note	given	the	above	restriction	on	occupancy,	the	inability	to	express	the	partition	function	Z(N)	as	a	direct	product	of	N	individual	degrees	of	freedom	yields	for	the	mean	occupancy	number:				 	 	 nsFD = 1eβ (εs−µ ) +1 	 	 	 	 	 	 (22)		which	is	the	Fermi-Dirac	distribution.				 Thus,	for	both	bosons	and	fermions,	the	chemical	potential	µ	is	involved	in	a	crucial,	non-separable	way.	Its	relation	to	N	is	fixed	by	(21),	i.e.:		 			 	 	 N = N = 1eβ (εs−µ ) ±1s∑ 		 	 	 	 	 (23)			 Does	the	chemical	potential	play	any	role	in	the	classical	case?	Yes,	but	only	trivially,	as	a	normalizing	factor.	In	the	‘dilute’	(low-occupancy)	limit	yielding	the	classical	case,	the	exponential	factor	involving	µ		approaches	the	particle	number	N	divided	by	the	single-particle	partition	function,	i.e.,			 	 eβµ → N
ζ
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	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (24)	
	So	that	the	Maxwell	Boltzmann	distribution	can	be	expressed	in	terms	of	µ	as:		
		
	 ni(MB) = Nζ e−βεi = eβµe−βεi = 1eβ (εi−µ ) 	 	 	 	 	 	 (25)		In	this	form,	it	is	easy	to	see	that	the	classical	case	emerges	from	the	quantum	distributions	when	
εi	>>	µ		for	all	i.				 In	summary,	we	make	the	following	observations	based	on	the	derivations	of	the	respective	distributions.	For	a	classical	system	comprising	N	degrees	of	freedom,	we	can	simply	assume	that	
N	is	fixed,	and	use	the	‘canonical	ensemble’	to	obtain	the	distribution.	For	that	purpose,	we	can	express	the	total	canonical	partition	function	Z(N)	as	simply	the	product	of	the	individual	partition	functions	ζi	for	the	component	degrees	of	freedom.				 But	for	a	quantum	system	with	fixed	N	(and	nonvanishing	mass),	we	cannot	use	the	canonical	ensemble;	we	must	use	the	‘grand	canonical	ensemble’	(i.e.	partition	function	Ž)–	representing	a	system	in	contact	with	both	an	energy	and	particle	reservoir.	That	is,	we	must	in-principle	allows	N	to	vary.		The	physical	content	of	this	procedure	is	as	follows:	the	chemical	potential	µ	is	a	Lagrange	multiplier,	representing	a	constraint	force	that	is	present	in	the	quantum	case,	even	if	there	is	no	contact	with	an	external	particle	reservoir.	Thus	the	natural	physical	interpretation	is	that	the	quantum	degrees	of	freedom	are	imposing	a	constraint	force	on	one	
another	that	is	not	present	in	the	classical	case.				 Based	on	the	above,	what	can	we	conclude	about	the	classical/quantum	divide?	We	cannot	treat	a	collection	of	N	quantum	objects	as	elements	of	separable	probability	spaces,	since	in	that	case	we	do	not	obtain	the	QM	statistics.	Non-separability	of	the	spaces	confirms	that	we	are	dealing	with	quantum	coherence,	with	all	its	attendant	features	such	as	entanglement	and	the	requirement	for	symmetrization	rendering	labels	superfluous	(the	latter	usually	and	reasonably	understood	as	reflecting	indistinguishability).	Moreover,	the	mutual	constraint	of	quantum	systems	expressed	by	the	chemical	potential	µ		(even	at	T=0)	reflects	a	peculiarly	quantum	sort	of	physical	correlation	or	interaction	not	present	in	the	classical	case	(probably	expressing	the	so-called	‘exchange	forces’	associated	with	symmetrization).4					 Thus,	our	finding	is	that	there	is	no	empirical	support	for	any	‘digital’	on/off	form	of	metaphysical	individuality	at	the	classical/quantum	border.	Since	the	classical	statistics	are	straightforwardly	obtainable	as	a	limit	from	the	quantum	statistics,	and	representable	in	terms	of	
Z-space,	we	can	confirm	Huggett's	result	that	the	capacity	of	classical	systems	to	carry	labels	that	simply	permute	to	form	new	system	states	(i.e.,	new	Γ-space	configurations)	is	not	reflected	in	the	statistics.	Yet	clearly,	the	classical	limit	brings	with	it	some	sort	of	new	capacity	for	permutable	labeling	of	the	component	systems,	in	that	the	collective	partition	function	can	be	obtained	from	individual	partition	functions	ζi	in-principle	capable	of	carrying	the	permutable	label	i.	This	indicates	that	in	the	classical	limit,	the	component	systems	acquire	a	form	of	distinguishibility.	In	the	next	section,	we	investigate	the	nature	of	this	emergence,	in	the	classical	limit,	of	the	capacity	to	carry	a	label.																																																												4	Of	course,	this	is	a	misnomer;	there	is	no	real	‘force’	operating	here	in	the	usual	physical	sense.	
		
3.	Whence	quasi-classical	distinguishability	in	the	dilute	limit?				 The	dilute	limit,	yielding	classicality,	is	known	to	be	obtained	in	the	'small	wavelength	limit,'	through	the	use	of	the	so-called	'thermal	wavelength'	λth.		The	usual	ways	of	obtaining	the λth	condition	can	be	criticized	for	conflating	classical	and	quantum	quantities.	For	example,	one	typical	method	for	deriving		λth	is	by	treating	it	as	a	kind	of	quantum-mechanical	position	uncertainty	Δx	corresponding	to	the	root-mean-square	uncertainty	ΔpRMS	of	the	momentum	of	the	component	degrees	of	freedom	(at	a	given	temperature	T).	That	is,	one	starts	with	the	expression			 	 ΔpRMS = p2 − p 2 		 	 	 	 	 (26)			The	average	momentum	<p>	appearing	in	(26)	is	assumed	to	be	zero	because	of	‘random	motion’--thus,	it	is	an	average	over	N	independent	degrees	of	freedom,	not	an	expectation	value	for	any	quantum	state.		ΔpRMS	is	then	taken	as	equal	to	the	square	root	of	the	average	squared	momentum	
<p2>,	which	is	obtained	from	the	equipartition	theorem:				 	 	 p2 = 3mkT 	 	 	 	 	 	 (27)		So	from	(26)	and	(27),	the	quantity	ΔpRMS 	is	taken	to	be				 	 	 ΔpRMS = 3mkT 	 	 	 	 	 (28)		and	this	(despite	the	fact	that	it	is	not	a	real	momentum	uncertainty	but	rather	a	root-mean-square	error)	is	plugged	into	the	uncertainty	relation	to	obtain	a	corresponding	'thermal	wavelength'		λth		:			 	 	 λth = h3mkT 	 	 	 	 	 	 (29)		Clearly,	in	this	context,	λth			is	assumed	to	be	a	kind	of	position	uncertainty.	It's	then	demanded	that	this	be	much	smaller	than	the	average	interparticle	spacing	d,	where					 	 	 d = VN⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟1/3 ,	 	 	 	 	 	 (30)		the	idea	being	that	this	condition	makes	the	gas	“dilute”	(i.e.,	no	particles	ever	occupying	same	position	x;	and	many	positions	unoccupied--see	Figure	1.).	So	the	'thermal	wavelength'	condition	for	classicality	becomes:		
		
	 	 	 h3mkT << VN⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟1/3 	 	 	 	 	 (31)				
		 Figure	1.	One	way	of	picturing	the	'thermal	wavelength'	condition		for	the	classical	limit	of	a	quantum	distribution.			However,	as	alluded	to	above,	the	preceding	derivation	applies	a	classical,	not	quantum,	uncertainty	to	momentum	in	two	distinct	ways:		
 averaging	over	N	systems	assumed	to	be	in	‘random	motion’	to	get	a	vanishing	value	for	
<p>	
 use	of	the	classical	Equipartition	Theorem	to	get	a	value	for	<p2>		The	resulting	momentum	uncertainty	is	only	an	epistemic	average	over	many	different	phase	space	points,	not	an	intrinsic	quantum	uncertainty	arising	from	a	single	state	having	an	intrinsic	‘coarse-graining’	represented	by	a	finite-sized	element	of	phase	space.	It	is	arguably	therefore	not	the	correct	quantity	for	applicability	of	the	uncertainty	relation	between	position	and	momentum.	Moreover,	the	derivation	of	the	Equipartition	Theorem,	which	is	used	to	obtain	that	root-mean-square	‘momentum	uncertainty,’	presupposes	classical	Maxwell-Boltzmann	statistics!			 In	addition,	the	derivation	conflates	a	wavelength	with	a	position	uncertainty,	which	is	problematic:	if	a	system	has	a	well-defined	wavelength	λ,	then	it	has	infinite	position	uncertainty.	Thus,	λth	is	really	being	interpreted	as	the	spread	of	a	‘wave	packet,’	despite	the	fact	that	the	states	available	to	the	systems	making	up	the	gas	are	not	necessarily	described	by	wave	packets	(i.e.,	in	the	quantum	limit,	they	are	plane	waves).			
		
	 Of	course,	it	is	well-known	that	classical	behavior	emerges	in	the	small-wavelength	limit,	so	rather	than	try	to	pretend	that	a	wavelength	is	a	position	uncertainty,	one	can	simply	work	with	the	DeBroglie	wavelength	of	the	average	momentum		(still	using	the	Equipartition	Theorem)	to	obtain	the	same	condition	(31).		But	in	this	case,	one	cannot	explain	the	classical	behavior	in	this	limit	by	saying	that	the	gas	is	‘dilute,’	as	pictured	in	Figure	1,	since	it	retains	a	nonlocal	character	arising	from	the	presumed	exact	wavelengths	of	its	degrees	of	freedom.	So	the	question	is:	why	does	condition	(31)	seem	to	work	so	well	as	a	criterion	for	the	classical	limit?			 It	turns	out	that	if	we	re-express	(31)	in	terms	of	thermal	energy	kT	,	we	find	the	condition	(neglecting	numerical	constants	of	order	unity):		
kT >> h
2
m
N
V
⎛
⎝
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2/3 	 	 	 	 	 (32)			But	the	quantity	on	the	right-hand	side	is	then	recognized	as	the	Fermi	Energy,	which	is	the	chemical	potential	µ	for	fermions	at	T=0:			
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= µ(T = 0) 	 	 	 	 (33)		And	in	fact,	this	condition	kT	>>	EF		is	also	the	well-known	condition	for	the	classical	limit	of	the	Fermi-Dirac	distribution.	So	what	happens	in	this	limit	that	could	justify	a	classical	description?	Once	again,	the	chemical	potential	µ(T)	has	much	to	teach	us.		 Specifically,	µ	is	crucially	related	to	the	Helmholtz	free	energy	F,	defined	as			
F	=	U−TS		 	 	 	 	 	 (34)	 	
		Specifically,	µ	is	the	change	in	F	when	adding	a	degree	of	freedom	(at	a	given	T	and	V),	i.e.:		
µ =
ΔF
ΔN
⎛
⎝
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T ,V
	 	 	 	 	 	 (35)	
	
	 Now,	µ	is	of	large	magnitude	and	negative	in	the	classical	limit	of	large	T,	small	N/V,	and	small	λth,	as	can	be	seen	from	the	well-known	relation5:		
µ clas⎯ →⎯ −kT ln
V
Nλth3
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟ 	 	 	 	 	 (36)		
																																																								5	See,	e.g.,	Kelly	(2002)	for	details.		
		
If	we	can	understand	the	physical	significance	of	the	negativity	(and	large	magnitude)	of	µ	in	the	classical	limit	as	expressed	by	(36),	we	may	hope	to	gain	insight	into	the	ontology	of	the	quantum/classical	transition.		A	large	negative	value	of	µ	=ΔF/ΔN	means	that	F	decreases	significantly	when	a	degree	of	freedom	is	added	to	the	system.		Since	F	=	U	− TS,	increasing	the	entropy	S	is	the	only	way	to	decrease	F.	This	indicates	that	the	addition	of	a	degree	of	freedom	in	the	classical	limit	increases	the	entropy	far	more	than	it	increases	the	internal	energy	U.	The	higher	the	temperature	T,	the	larger	this	decrease,	and	the	more	negative	µ	becomes.	Thus,	a	large	
negative	µ	corresponds	to	a	large	entropy	increase	of	the	whole	system	whenever	a	degree	of	
freedom	is	added,	accompanied	by	a	negligible	increase	in	internal	energy.	The	same	basic	situation	applies	to	bosons,	although	in	that	case	µ	can	never	be	positive,	and	with	increasing	T,	it	becomes	more	and	more	negative	while	more	of	the	higher	energy	states	εs	become	populated	(and	the	system	becomes	more	dilute	in	terms	of	state	occupancy).			 We	can	therefore	summarize	as	follows,	guided	by	the	clues	provided	by	the	behavior	of	the	chemical	potential.	In	the	classical	(dilute)	limit,	adding	a	degree	of	freedom	results	in	a	statistically	independent	increase	in	the	overall	state	space,	increasing	the	entropy	with	comparatively	small	increase	in	U.		In	contrast,	in	the	quantum	domain,	we	have	two	cases:	(i)	for	fermions,	adding	a	degree	of	freedom	increases	U	more	than	it	increases	TS;	(ii)	for	bosons,	the	entropy	term	(−TS)	is	always	larger	in	magnitude	than	U,	but	the	increase	in	U	is	non-negligible	compared	to	the	increase	in	the	magnitude	of	TS.		The	physical	origin	of	the	relatively	small	increase	in	TS	when	adding	a	degree	of	freedom	in	the	quantum	limit	is	the	following:	the	new	degree	of	freedom	has	to	find	an	energy	level	contingent	on	the	pre-existing	energy	level	structure,	which	reduces	the	availability	of	states	that	would	have	been	available	in	the	classical	case.	Thus	the	entropy	increase	(which	is	a	measure	of	the	increase	in	the	number	of	available	states)	is	much	smaller	than	what	obtains	in	the	classical	case.		Once	again,	the	quantum	degrees	of	freedom	“know	about	each	other”	and	evidently	have	some	form	of	interaction	(quantified	by	the	chemical	potential),	even	at	T=0	when	there	are	no	thermal	interactions	at	all.	They	are	not	independent	and	separable.			4.	Conclusions.		 By	examining	the	derivations	of	the	quantum	and	classical	distributions,	we	have	found	that	separability	of	the	individual	probability	spaces	fails	in	the	quantum	domain.		In	contrast,	in	the	classical	limit,	the	probability	spaces	of	the	component	degrees	of	freedom	are	fully	separable.	In	addition,	by	examining	the	role	of	the	chemical	potential	µ,	we	find	a	clear	manifestation	of	the	highly	non-classical	constraints	that	quantum	degrees	of	freedom	impose	on	one	another	via	the	‘exchange	forces’	corresponding	to	the	need	for	symmetrization.		We	also	confirm,	via	the	behavior	of	µ,	that	in	the	classical	limit,	adding	a	degree	of	freedom	gives	rise	to	new	energy	states	for	the	whole	system	of	N	degrees	of	freedom,	independently	of	the	state	occupancies	of	the	pre-existing	N-1	degrees	of	freedom—increasing	entropy	with	minimal	increase	in	internal	energy.			Thus,	classical	systems	(those	obeying	Maxwell-Boltzmann	statistics)	have	a	form	of	separability	and	independence	not	applying	to	quantum	systems.	This	separability	amounts	to	distinguishability,	since	one	could	in-principle	apply	labels	to	the	N	individual	state-spaces	making	up	the	collective	state	space	(as	in	a	Γ-space	representation).			
		
However,	it	is	notable	that	impenetrability	does	not	come	into	the	picture	in	any	fundamental	way,	because	we	need	only	consider	energy	states	(not	position)	in	order	to	obtain	Maxwell-Boltzmann	statistics.	Nevertheless,	what	about	our	intuition	(also	reflected	in	the	usual	derivation	of	the	‘thermal	wavelength’	criterion	as	illustrated	in	Figure	1)	that	classical	objects	do	not	overlap	in	spacetime,	and	are	fundamentally	independent	from	one	another?	Einstein	addressed	this	classical	notion	of	separability	in	terms	of	his	‘being	thus’	concept:			
An essential aspect of this arrangement of things in physics is that they lay claim, at a certain time, to an 
existence independent of one another, provided that these objects ‘are situated in different parts of space.’ Unless 
one makes this kind of assumption about the independence of the existence (the ‘being–thus’) of objects which 
are far apart from one another in space—which stems in the first place from everyday thinking—physical 
thinking in the familiar sense would not be possible. It is also hard to see any way of formulating and testing the 
laws of physics unless one makes a clear distinction of this kind. (Einstein, 1948) 	Of	course,	when	he	made	this	statement,	Einstein	was	resisting	the	quantum	nonlocality	and/or	nonseparability	that	was	evident	in	the	context	of	the	famous	EPR	experiment	(Einstein,	Podolsky,	Rosen	1935).		It	has	since	become	clear	that	it	is	indeed	possible,	and	necessary,	to	formulate	and	test	the	laws	of	physics	without	relying	on	this	sort	of	classical	picture	at	all	levels.			We	can	trace	the	emergence	of	Einstein’s	‘being	thus’	in	the	classical	limit	by	noting	that	the	latter	obtains	for	high	thermal	energies	kT	(eqn.	32).		What	can	be	deduced	from	that	depends	on	one’s	interpretation	of	the	quantum	formalism.	In	a	unitary-only	account,	high	thermal	energies	enable	decoherence	arguments	to	proceed	(Joos	and	Zeh,	1985),	although	that	account	has	been	criticized	on	the	basis	of	entanglement	relativity	and	circularity	(e.g.,	Dugić and Jeknić-Dugić	(2012),	Fields	(2010),	Kastner	2014,	2016).				Another	interpretive	approach	is	to	take	the	projection	postulate	of	von	Neumann	as	a	real	physical	process	(i.e.	a	‘collapse’	interpretation).	One	such	approach	is	actually	a	different	theory	from	quantum	mechanics:	the	Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber	(1985)	‘GRW’	mechanism	requires	an	ad	
hoc	modification	to	the	Schrödinger	evolution.	In	contrast,	a	collapse	interpretation		that	does	not	change	the	basic	quantum	theory	is	the	(Relativistic)	Transactional	Interpretation	(RTI),	which	takes	the	advanced	states	as	playing	a	physical	role	in	measurement	by	breaking	the	linearity	of	the	evolution	and	giving	rise	to	the	von	Neumann	‘measurement	transition’	(Kastner	2016a;	2012,	Chapter	3).	6		High	thermal	energies	kT	give	rise	to	frequent	inelastic	scatterings	among	the	degrees	of	freedom	of	the	gas	and	thermal	photons.	According	to	RTI,	inelastic	scatterings	correspond	to	collapses,	which	serve	to	localize	the	component	degrees	of	freedom—giving	them	effective	separate	and	distinct	spacetime	trajectories,	conferring	independence	and	thus	restoring	Einstein’s	notion	of	‘being	thus’.7		
																																																								6	The	original	TI	as	proposed	in	Cramer	(1986)	was	limited	to	the	non-relativistic	domain,	and	took	emitters	and	absorbers	as	primitive.	The	extension	of	TI	to	the	relativistic	domain	(RTI)	by	the	present	author	has	allowed	a	quantitative	definition	of	emitters	and	absorbers	from	underlying	principles	(Kastner	2012,	Chapter	6;	Kastner	2016a),	and	full	refutation	of	the	consistency	challenge	raised	by	Maudlin	(1996)	The	refutation	is	presented	in	Kastner	2016b.		7	Another	advantage	of	this	approach	is	to	provide	a	physical	grounding	for	the	Second	Law	of	Thermodynamics	at	the	micro-level	(Kastner	2017).	
		
	It	should	also	be	noted	that	under	the	RTI	model	with	a	real	non-unitary	transition	defining	‘measurement,’	interference	truly	does	disappear	upon	measurement,	in	contrast	to	the	usual	assumption	of	unitary-only	evolution.	This	resolves	the	issue	alluded	to	(for	example)	in	French	and	Redhead	(1988),	who	say:			
But,	of	course,	ontologically	speaking,	'interference'	is	never	strictly	absent.	That,	after	all,	is	what	constitutes	the	
'problem	of	measurement'	in	QM,	so	the	involvement	of	every	electron	with	the	state	of	every	other	electron	in	the	universe,	
although	negligible	for	practical	purposes,	remains	an	ontological	commitment	of	QM,	under	the	interpretation	where	the	
particles	are	treated	as	individuals.	(French	and	Redhead	1988,	245)	
	In	contrast,	under	RTI,	the	above	form	of	global	interference	does	vanish	upon	the	non-unitary	transition	in	which	a	transaction	is	actualized.	Since	transactions	are	very	frequent	in	the	conditions	defining	the	classical	limit,	this	can	be	seen	as	directly	supporting	the	independence,	or	‘being	thus,’	of	systems	in	the	classical	limit.		Whichever	interpretation	one	adopts,	in	the	domain	of	high	thermal	energies	kT,	one	gets	at	least	effective	determinacy	of	position	over	time,	and	thus	a	unique	spacetime	trajectory	for	each	degrees	of	freedom.	Such	a	trajectory	confers	the	capacity	for	a	unique	label,	and	therefore	supports	distinguishability	of	the	degree	of	freedom	to	which	it	corresponds.	This	does	not	amount	to	a	haecceitistic	label,	since	it	is	conferred	based	on	qualitative	features	of	the	degrees	of	freedom	(i.e.	their	trajectories).	Nevertheless,	as	noted	by	French	and	Redhead,	one	may	still	regard	all	systems	(classical	and	quantum)	as	haecceitistic	under	a	suitable	interpretation	of	individuality.	This	paper	takes	no	position	on	that	metaphysical	issue.		
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